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CRIMINAL LAW-THE LINEUP'S LAMENT
KIRBY v. ILLINOIS
On February 21, 1968, Willie Shard reported to the Chicago police that
the previous day two men had robbed him of a wallet containing, among
other things, travelers checks and a social security card. On February 22,
two police officers stopped the defendant and a companion on West Mad-
ison Street in Chicago for interrogation. Defendant was stopped because
he resembled a man wanted by the police. When asked for identifica-
tion, the defendant produced a wallet that contained three travelers checks
and a social security card, all bearing the name of Willie Shard. Papers
with Shard's name on them were also found on the defendant's com-
panion. When asked to explain his possession of Shard's property, the de-
fendant first said that the travelers checks were "play money", and then
told the officers that he had won them in a craps game. The officers
then arrested the two men and took them to a police station.'
Only after arriving at the police station and checking the records
there did the arresting officers learn of the Shard robbery. A police car
was then dispatched to Shard's place of employment, where it picked up
Shard and brought him to the police station. Immediately upon entering
the room in the police station where the defendant and his companion
were seated at a table, Shard positively identified them as the two men
who had robbed him two days earlier. No lawyers were present in the
room, and neither the petitioner nor his companion had asked for or been
advised of any right to the presence of counsel. Six weeks later, the de-
fendant was indicted for robbery. At the trial, after a pre-trial motion
to suppress his testimony had been overruled, Shard testified as to his
previous identification of the defendant and again identified him as the
robber. The defendant was found guilty, and the conviction was upheld
on appeal. While the lineup previously had been deemed a critical stage
1. In People v. Bean, 121 Ill. App. 2d 332, 257 N.E.2d 562 (1970), the First
District Court of Appeals held that Bean's conviction (Kirby's companion) was based
on an identification which was the fruit of an unlawful arrest. It was unlawful
because the search was based on his accompanying a man who resembled a person
the police wanted and because he could not produce an identification. The appellate
court reversed the conviction on the grounds that the identification was a "product
of the unlawful seizure of his person and consequently all testimony relating thereto
[was] improperly admitted into evidence against him." 121 II1. App. 2d at 335, 257
N.E.2d at 564.
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and the right to counsel was extended to those who had already been in-
dicted, 2 the United States Supreme Court held in this case that the right
to counsel does not extend to lineups which occur prior to an indictment
of the participants. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
With this decision the Court establishes an exact point in time for judg-
ing when the right to counsel becomes available prior to trial. When
the process shifts from investigatory to a formal accusation, the right to
counsel is considered necessary to protect the accused. Thus, the in-
dictment is fixed as the critical stage whereupon counsel is required to
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. In so doing, however, the de-
cision signifies a movement away from the spirit of the previous right to
counsel cases by evidencing a greater concern for police efficiency than for
the liberty of the individual. In order to discern that movement, this
note will attempt to show that Kirby v. Illinois3 is but another indication
of the fact that the whole area of right to counsel at lineups is perforated
by incongruities; that due to this confusion the basic reason for having
counsel at lineups, the protection of individual freedom, has been ignored
to satisfy adherents of police efficiency.
The right to counsel has had a long and precarious history. Prior to
1963, its existence was couched within the margins of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4  In broad and sweeping language,
the Court of 1932, in Powell v. Alabama,5 held that the right to counsel
at a trial was one of those certain "immutable principles of justice which
2. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Wade].
3. 406 U.S. 682 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kirby].
4. It was an elementary principle that the first ten amendments constituted
limitations only on the federal government and not on the states: see Ohio ex
rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172
(1899); Twitchell v. The Commonwealth, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1868); Withers
v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84 (1857); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
242 (1833). There were, however, some exceptions; see first amendment cases:
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); and Chicago,
B.&Q.R.R. Co. of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) holding that the fifth amendment
right to just compensation was within due process of the law. It should be noted
that there was an undercurrent expressed by some of the Justices that the Bill of
Rights necessarily applied to the states; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
345-47 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Gideon] which cites a review of ten Justices
sympathetic to this view; In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 337 (1957) (Black dissenting);
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 678 (1948) (Douglas dissenting); Foster v. Illinois,
332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947) (Black dissenting); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474
(1942) (Black dissenting); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 547-58 (1884)
(Harlan dissenting). Arising out of the fear of abusive state practices, the Court
resorted to the use of the fourteenth amendment to oversee state activities.
5. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Powell].
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inhere in the very idea of free government"6 and it was one of the " 'fun-
damental principles of liberty and justice' "I guaranteed by the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court characterized the
importance of the lawyer's role by saying that:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense, even though he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceeding against him.
8
Though Powell dealt with a capital case, the author of the opinion, in a
later discussion, described the Powell rule in broad terms without regard
to a capital-non-capital distinction. 9
At first the Court was comfortable with this standard and had no
trouble extending it to other trial-related issues. 10 Then ten years after
Powell, the Court, in a non-capital case Betts v. Brady," distinguished it
from Powell on the grounds that Powell was a capital case and Betts was
not. It was then held that the Court should decide on a case by case basis
by "an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case.' 2 Though the
Court recognized that previous decisions lent color to the argument that
the right to counsel ought to apply to non-capital cases,' 8 it was afraid of
falling into the "habit of formulating the guarantee into a set of hard and
fast rules. .... ,,. 4
Decisions subsequent to Betts have borne out the fact that this distinc-
tion caused great debate' 5 and discrepancy in decision-making.' 6 Finally,
6. Id. at 68-69.
7. Id. at 67.
8. Id. at 69.
9. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936).
10. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) held that the defendant was
denied counsel when the same counsel defended both co-defendants; Avery v. Ala-
bama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940) allowed counsel to consult with defendant to pre-
pare his defense.
11. 316 U.S. 455 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Betts].
12. Id. at 462.
13. Id. at 462-63: citing Powell, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) and Avery v. Alabama,
308 U.S. 444 (1939).
14. 316 U.S. at 462.
15. Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissented in Betts; even Mr. Justice
Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937), four years prior to
Betts, felt no need to distinguish between capital and non-capital offenses. A few
Justices have taken time to note what an anathema the Betts decision was; see
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,
519 (1962) (Black dissenting); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 677 (1948) (Doug-
las dissenting).
16. Some cases followed the Betts rule in non-capital cases; see Gryger v. Burke,
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in 1963, Betts was explicitly overruled by Gideon17 in an effort by the
Court to make this right more certain. By incorporating the sixth amend-
ment into the fourteenth, the Court in Gideon embedded the right in an
air of relative certainty and ended the confusion caused by the Betts
ruling. Once Gideon established a definitive right to counsel at the trial,
the ensuing decisions began to establish those critical points where the
right arose.
Affirming a pre-Gideon case, Hamilton v. Alabama's (where the right
was extended to an arraignment), the Court in White v. Maryland19 held
that a hearing in which the defendant was forced to enter a plea 20 was
tantamount to an arraignment and that the defendant was entitled to have
counsel present. 21 Extending the right even further, the Court, in Mas-
siah v. United States,22 held that allowing into evidence incriminating
statements elicited in a secret interrogation after indictment and in the
absence of counsel "contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the con-
duct of criminal causes and [violates] fundamental rights of persons
charged with [a] crime."' 23 Noting the constitutional principle estab-
lished in Powell, the Court said that the assistance of counsel, "'during
perhaps the most critical period of the proceeding . . . from the time of
their arraignment until the beginning of their trial' "24 was of vital impor-
tance.
The final major area of concern to face the Court in its efforts to fix
the critical point was the time period preceding any formal state action
334 U.S. 728 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Gayes v. New York,
332 U.S. 145 (1947); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947). Some of the earlier
non-capital cases, however, used the factual situation to distinguish them so as to
hold a denial of due process; see Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948);
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
As late as 1961, however, the Court, still dissatisfied with the distinction, held for
the petitioner in two non-capital cases; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1961)
and Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
17. 372 U.S. at 339: facts were ostensibly the same as in Betts.
18. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
19. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
20. Under Maryland law, this procedure was called a preliminary hearing.
21. 373 U.S. at 60: in reversing the court of appeals' judgment, the Court
quoted Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. at 55: "Only the presence of counsel
could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to
plead intelligently." For a discussion of the right to counsel prior to trial during
this period see W. BEANEY, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 Minn. L.
Rev. 771 (1961) and NOTE, Criminal Procedure-Right to Counsel Prior to Trial,
44 Ky. L.J. 103 (1955).
22. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
23. Id. at 205.
24. Id.
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prior to trial. Having previously considered such cases under the paternal
guidance of Betts,25 the Warren Court was now able to take a fresh look
at those cases without the weight of Betts and decide anew. In overruling
any case inconsistent with its holding, the Court found the critical point
to be when the police investigation was no longer a general inquiry but
focused on a particular suspect in police custody.26  Thus, in Escobedo,
the Court ruled that to make the right to counsel a function of whether an
indictment had been secured would "exalt form over substance. ' 27  The
Court felt that to rule otherwise would make "the trial no more than an
appeal from the interrogation. '28 In combining the fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights, the Court in Escobedo held that the adversary system began
when the process focused on the accused, and at that point counsel be-
came a necessary ingredient in a fair system of criminal justice.
2 9
Going further than Escobedo in seeking to "dispel the compelling at-
mosphere of the interrogation,"30 the Court, two years later in Miranda,
set down clear-cut guidelines for the protection of those held for custodial
interrogation. The purpose of forcing law enforcement officials to ad-
minister these warnings, 31 especially the right to counsel, was to protect
the privilege to remain silent. The rights arose when the suspect was
"taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way."'32 The practical effect of Escobedo and Miranda was
that counsel was deemed an essential participant, unless waived, when the
investigation focused on the individual, irrespective of whether any formal
action had been initiated. Both decisions were primarily couched in terms
of protecting the individual from state procedures that threatened his lib-
25. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) holding that refusal of
counsel was not a denial of due process during the interrogation under the facts;
Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) counsel is only "one pertinent element in
determining from all the circumstances whether a conviction was attended by
fundamental unfairness." 357 U.S. at 509. The Court held that denial of
counsel, under the facts, did not prejudice the defendant.
26. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Escobedo]:
here the suspect requested and was denied counsel who was present in the police
station and the police did not warn him of his right to remain silent.
27. Id. at 486.
28. Id. at 487. See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 340 (1957), a pre-Gideon
decision where defendant, unlike Escobedo, did not request counsel.
29. Id. at 492.
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Miranda].
31. Id. at 467-73: right to remain silent; that anything said can be used
against the individual in court; right to consult with a lawyer during the interroga-
tion; if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
32. Id. at 444.
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erty. The extension of counsel to custodial interrogation was not an arbi-
trary maneuver. It plainly rested on the word custody as an objectively
significant time to allow the individual assistance in understanding his
relationship with the state.38 In recognizing the need for the accused
to be on equal footing, the Court went even further. At the expense of a
per se exclusionary rule, the Court in Miranda forced agents of the state
to act as impartial liaisons by giving the accused specific warnings, some
of which would ordinarily be given by counsel. This step connoted a
reverence for individual liberty. By trying to put one in custody on
equal footing with the state by providing counsel, the Court is acting in
the best interests of a state whose primary concern is protecting individual
liberty. If viewed in this light, these decisions must be read broadly, in
accordance with their spirit, to accomplish that end.8 4
Keeping this background of cases in mind, the Supreme Court was able
to take a fresh look at the need for counsel at line-ups. This uncertain 5
journey began on June 12, 1967, with United States v. Wade,3 6 Gilbert v.
California,3 7 and Stovall v. Denno s.3  Having accepted those cases on the
basis of the right to counsel issue, the Court resorted to the critical stage
doctrine. A stage was, and still is, critical if at that point the denial of
counsel would deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Clearly, this
doctrine is applicable where there are objective criteria for determining
whether the accused's rights have been derogated.3 9  Such criteria in the
case of lineups, however, are not so easy to find.
33. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), extending Miranda outside
the police station (to a bedroom), and Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968),
extending Miranda to a tax investigation.
34. The strong language put forth in Gideon is but one indication of the
Court's desire to protect the individual: "Governments, both state and federal,
quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants
accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to pro-
tect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants
charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to
prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute
and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest in-
dications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities,
not luxuries." 372 U..S. at 344.
35. At the heart of this uncertainty is the fact that there is no firm evidence
that lineups are actually trustworthy and accurate. There is very little empirical
data because this procedure has been solely within police domain and has been
deemed, for such a long time, as obviously the best form of proof.
36. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
37. 388 U.S. 263 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Gilbert].
38. 388 U.S. 293 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Stovall].
39. For example, at an arraignment where counsel is needed to help the de-
fendant plead. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
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In the first case, Wade, an in-court identification based on a lineup with-
out counsel resulted in a conviction. The Court held that though the
right to counsel did not apply to protect any fifth amendment right,
40 it
did apply to the lineup so as not to deprive the defendant of the "right
to a fair trial at which the witnesses against him might be meaningfully
cross-examined."' 41  After reviewing the interrogation cases, the Court
pointed out that:
nothing decided or said in the opinions in the cited cases [Escobedo and Miranda]
links the right to counsel only to protection of the Fifth Amendment rights. Rather
those decisions "no more than reflect a constitutional principle" . . . that in addi-
tion to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand
alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court
or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial.4
2
The Court, by implication, suggested that though the right to counsel did
not protect the fifth amendment right, it might, as proposed above, be
considered within a broad view of Escobedo. This avenue, however, was
not pursued any further.
The Court then moved on to decide whether lack of counsel denied
the accused a right to a fair trial. By citing many instances of erroneous
eyewitness identifications and suggestive police practices, the Court em-
phatically based its decision that counsel was necessary on the fact that
the lineup was a procedure inherently wrought with prejudicial dangers
due to the nature of the lineup itself.48 Counsel's presence was consid-
40. 388 U.S. at 221-23. The Court held that the fifth amendment right cov-
ered only testimony and not mere physical presence or a verbal utterance for voice
identification (as was also true here). Justices Black and Douglas dissented and
Justices Warren and Fortas felt that the utterance was in violation of Wade's fifth
amendment right. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Holt v.
United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
41. 388 U.S. at 224.
42. Id. at 226.
43. Id. at 228-39: "We do not assume that these risks are the result of police
procedures intentionally designed to prejudice an accused. Rather we assume
they derive from the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the sug-
gestibility inherent in the context of the pretrial identification." Id. at 235. In
Wade, one witness, the bank cashier, stated that he had seen Wade standing in
the hallway near an FBI agent and that later five or six persons appeared in the
hallway. The bank vice president admitted that he had seen a person in the hallway
in the custody of the FBI and that that person resembled the person subsequently
identified as the robber. See E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1961);
E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 258 (1955); FRANK AND FRANK, NOT GUILTY 61
(1957); F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETrI (1927); H. GROSS,
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 47-54 (Jackson ed. 1962); R. RINGEL, IDENTIFICATION
AND POLICE LINEUPS (1966); ROLPH, PERSONAL IDENTITY: P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965); WENTWORTH AND WLDEN, PERSONAL
666
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ered important so that he could reconstruct the lineup in his efforts to
meaningfully cross-examine the witnesses, 44 but the role of counsel at the
lineup was discussed in very vague terms without enumerating what
could or could not be done.4 5 From within that cloud of uncertainty,
the Court then added that it left open the possibility for legislatures to
eliminate the abuses and thereby remove the basis for regarding this
stage as critical.
46
In setting down its rule, the Court felt that the in-court identification
based on the illegal lineup was to be excluded unless the prosecution
could show that the in-court identification was based on an independent
IDENTIFICATION 37 (1918); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 786(a); 3 (1940); WIG-
MORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF §§ 250-53, 3 (1937); G. WILLIAMS,
PROOF OF GUILT 110-13 (1963); WILLS, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 192-205
(1937). The Case against Personal Identification, 13 FORTNIGHTLY L.J. 87 (1943);
MURRAY, The Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 610;
PAUL, Identification of Accused Persons, 12 AusTL. L.J. 42 (1938); READ, Lawyers
at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance, 17 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 339 (1966); WILLIAMS AND HAMMELMAN. Identification Parades, Pt. 1 and 2,
1963 CRIM. L. REV. 470-90, 545-55. See 39 A.L.R.3d 487 (1971).
44. 388 U.S. at 230-32.
45. Id. at 237-38: the Court felt it could not refuse to recognize the right to
counsel for fear that counsel would obstruct justice. Counsel's presence may in
fact be beneficial so as to prevent the infiltration of the taint of an illegal lineup.
But there are some perplexing questions as to the appropriate role of counsel
which complicates matters even more. As McCormick points out: "Is he
to be merely an observer, whose presence is required so that he will have the
information necessary effectively to point out to the trial jury any factors in
the lineup that should be considered in weighing the probative value of the
witnesses' trial testimony? If so, it is arguable that counsel is ill-equipped to
perform this function. In the event that the facts at the lineup are put in issue, he
would then be required to testify himself, an awkward position for an attorney who
is also presenting the case. In the event that he observes conditions which might
adversely affect the witnesses' trial testimony, does he have any authority to have
them corrected? If he observes them but fails to bring them to the attention of
the police until after the witnesses' testimony has been "tainted," has he waived any
of his client's rights? 4 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 2d ed., at 409 (1972).
See also Panel Discussion-The Role of the Defense Lawyer at a Line-up in Light
of Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall Decisions, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 273 (1968); CoM-
MENT, Right to Counsel at Police Identification Proceedings: A Program in Effective
Implementation of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 65 (1968). See
RIPPLE, Eyewitness Identification-The Case for Preventive Counseling, 25 JAG J. 18
(1970).
46. Id. at 239. Since three of the Justices who felt the critical stage should
be extended to a lineup felt that the fifth amendment had been violated, it is rea-
sonable to assume that they might not feel that a legislature's solution would re-
move it from its critical stage status. Mr. Justice Black, who took issue with the
critical stage idea but felt that counsel should be extended, also would fit in
with the three other Justices (Douglas, Warren and Fortas).
It should also be noted that subsequent to Wade, the City of Chicago Police
Department adopted no rule which would correct the feared abuses.
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source.4 7 This qualified exclusionary rule was adopted because attacking
a procedure upon which the unequivocal courtroom identification was
based was an insurmountable burden for a counsel not present at the
lineup. Wade was remanded so that the lower court could determine
whether the in-court identification was of an independent source or if it
was a harmless error.
The second case in the lineup trilogy, Gilbert, dealt with a post-indict-
ment lineup where counsel was absent, and the defendant was placed on a
stage in order to be viewed by one hundred people for a multitude of of-
fenses. The Court here focused on two distinct types of testimony. By
applying Wade, the Court first held that any testimony of an identification
of the defendant in court stemming from an illegal lineup (one without
counsel) should be excluded as long as there was no showing that
the in-court identification was of an independent source.48  Secondly, the
Court held that any testimony of an out-of-court lineup identification
where counsel was absent was to be per se excluded. The basis for the
per se exclusionary rule was founded on the belief that testimony of an
out-of-court illegal identification would "enhance the impact of his in-
court identification on the jury and seriously aggravate whatever deroga-
tion exists of the accused's right to a fair trial." 49  Gilbert was then re-
manded so that the California Supreme Court could decide whether there
was sufficient basis to render the errors harmless. 0
The final lineup case, Stovall, was, in actuality, a showup situation.
On August 25, 1961, Stovall was arrested on suspicion of the attempted
murder of one Ms. Behrendt and the murder of her husband. One day
after the arrest, without having been able to obtain counsel, defendant
was brought, handcuffed to one of the five accompanying policemen, to
the hospital and was identified by Ms. Behrendt. Mr. Justice Brernan
held that the Wade-Gilbert rule was not to be applied retroactively. 51 He
based his decision on the fact that it was a new standard "not fore-
47. Id. at 240.
48. 388 U.S. at 272-74.
49. Id. at 273-74.
50. Id. at 274.
51. 388 U.S. at 297. After setting forth the criteria for determining whether
it should be applied retroactively, the Court notes that Gideon, Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
were deemed to apply retroactively.
One should note that by not applying Wade retroactively, the Court is impliedly
consenting that, unlike the arraignment or trial, one can not be sure that the
lack of counsel will actually derogate an accused's right to a fair trial.
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shadowed . . . until Wade was decided by the Court of Appeals . . .,,52
and that if it was not applied retroactively, it "'would seriously disrupt
the administration of our criminal laws.' ,,53 In an effort to dispense prop-
erly with those cases not within the scope of the Wade-Gilbert rule, the
Court addressed itself to the issue of whether the showup violated due
process. Thus a second standard was established for those lineups that
took place prior to June 12, 1967. The basic tenets of the due process
evaluation consisted of whether:
the confrontation conducted in this case was so unnecessarily suggestive and con-
ducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law
. . [A] claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of confrontation
depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it .... 54
The record indicated that the immediate hospital confrontation was
imperative. The Court held that such an emergency (imminent death
of the victim) rendered the identification necessary and thus sufficient,
under the circumstances, to fall outside the ambit of the due process test.
However, the Court mentioned that the "practice of showing suspects
singly to persons for the purposes of identification, and not as part of a
lineup, has been widely condemned." 55
Upon a plain reading of "unnecessarily suggestive," one could inter-
pret "unnecessarily" as modifying "suggestive." "Unnecessarily" would
then pertain to the degree of wilfulness in allowing the procedure to be
"suggestive." It would seem to imply that there are certain steps that
could be taken to make the procedure less "suggestive" and that a fail-
ure to do so would render the procedure "unnecessarily suggestive." Such
an import, however, was not provided.
Instead the Court has distinguished between the two terms completely.
By doing so, the Court has forsaken the basic reasoning of Wade-that
lineups, and especially showups, are inherently suggestive. 56 The showup
in Stovall satisfied the due process test solely because it was necessary in
light of the fear of imminent death of the victim. The issue of sugges-
tiveness was not modified by necessity but instead superceded by it. Thus,
for those cases prior to June 12, 1967, the decision as to whether a
showup was necessary, regardless of the belief that they are inherently
52. Id. at 299.
53. Id. at 300. Mr. Justice Brennan felt that the possibility of fairness with-
out counsel was much greater than in the circumstances where retroactivity was
allowed.
54. Id. at 301-02. See also 39 A.L.R.3d 791 (1971).
55. Id. at 302.
56. 388 U.S. at 228-35.
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untrustworthy, falls back on the reliability57 of the identification based
on the surrounding circumstances of the showup. It would seem that the
more external factors present, the more reliable an inherently suggestive
procedure becomes.
That might very well be; however, it is not a logical extension of the
reasoning of Wade. The Court throws itself back into the confusing issue
that Wade was apparently trying to avoid: reliability. Once again, a
segment in the development of the right to counsel has become as uncer-
tain as it did the day Betts was decided.
In order to discriminate intelligently and further clarify the basic under-
lying issues, certain key factors of the lineup trilogy should be set forth
and discussed as later treatment of these issues may significantly effect
the future of the right to counsel.
If the trilogy is read broadly, one could conclude that if no counsel is
present at a lineup or showup, the conviction must be reversed unless it
can be shown that the in-court identification was of a sufficient inde-
pendent source or was a harmless error. And, for those cases prior to
57. Following Stovall's lead, these subsequent cases also held that the showup
was necessary though suggestive and thus not a denial of due process. In so de-
ciding they used a balancing approach when holding that the showup was reliable.
See United States v. Poe, 462 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hines,
455 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Loper v. Beto, 454 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Wilson,
449 F.2d 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Miller, 449 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir.
1971); United States ex. rel. Penachio v. Kropp, 448 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Washington, 447 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v.
Callahan, 439 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1971) (police arranging a "coincidental" showup
where witness happened to pick out the defendant was not suggestive and did not
violate due process); United States v. Hallman, 439 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(a lineup case), at 604: "The interest of justice includes approval of police tech-
niques even though they involve possibility of prejudice to the suspect, where the
overall balance lies in the furtherance of fair pre-trial identifications . . . ;" United
States v. Harris, 437 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Cunningham,
436 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Green, 436 F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir.
1970); United States v. Follette, 435 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v.
Wilson, 435 F.2d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1970); and see Russell v. United States, 408
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969) which held that an
"immediate on-the-scene confrontation at five o'clock in the morning when there
would necessarily be a long delay in summoning appellant's counsel, or a substitute
counsel, to observe a formal lineup [would not violate defendant's right]. Such
a delay may not only cause the detention of an innocent suspect; it may also
diminish the reliability of any identification obtained, thus defeating a principle
purpose of the counsel requirement. . . . We conclude, with some hesitation, that
Wade does not require exclusion of McCann's identification." 408 F.2d at 1283-84.
See also SOBEL, Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitations on
the Abuse of Pre-trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 261
(1971) and 1969 L. & Soc. ORDER 104.
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June 12, 1967, the due process test would be applied to determine
whether the totality of circumstances amount to a denial of due process
to the accused. Due to the divergent views in this area, some crucial
distinctions could narrow the above interpretation.
The most obvious factual distinction can be made with regard to the
actual time the right to counsel becomes critical. In those cases where the
right to counsel was based on the sixth amendment guarantee and was
deemed fundamental, the lineup took place after formal state action (an
indictment). It was of no consequence to Stovall that it took place be-
fore or after an indictment as its holding was to apply only to those
cases prior to the Wade date. Therefore, whether the sixth amendment
right to counsel was deemed a fundamental right to one not yet formally
charged remained technically open.
With regard to inherent suggestiveness, it should also be noted that a
showup was considered at least as contemptible as a lineup.58 In fact,
the decision to treat all three cases under the same rules gives weight to the
proposition that the Court did not mean to distinguish between a lineup
or a showup in any way that could imply that either procedure was ac-
ceptable. One should keep in mind, however, that it is possible to dis-
tinguish between a lineup and a showup in these cases. Such a differ-
entiation could have the effect of allowing a showup, applying the due
process test, outside the Wade-Gilbert rule, and thus allow the police to
hold showups in order to avoid any counsel requirement.
A most significant aspect of these cases, however, is the discrepancy
between the policy and actual rule of Wade. Wade's reasoning gets its
life-breath from the fact that the Court does not want to remain in the
precarious position of having to define reliability. In a close reading of
Wade, what waxes most important is that it attacks the very nature of the
lineup. The Wade rule, however, remains within the bounds of the critical
stage doctrine and thus does not truly reflect the Court's main objective.
A literal interpretation of Wade's reasoning would demand that the pro-
cedure be abolished. Not wanting to go that far, the Court applies a
rule which may not be relevant.
The rule, that counsel should be present so that the defendant's right
to a fair trial would not be derogated, may not be satisfactory when deal-
ing with lineups and showups. It is argued that counsel's mere presence
(since he can not play an active role) compels the lineup to be fair.
However, his presence might also cause the prejudicial activity to be
58. 388 U.S. at 234 and 388 U.S. at 302.
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simply less overt (like prior counseling of the witnesses). Thus, the de-
mise of the function of the critical stage doctrine might not secure justice
as counsel would be rendered helpless in an effort to meaningfully cross-
examine the witnesses anyway. Allowing the presence of counsel would
not get at the inherent suggestiveness and dangers intrinsic to eyewitness
identifications at lineups.
One result of this faulty nexus was depicted in Stovall where the Court,
in distinguishing between "unnecessarily" and "suggestive," applied a due
process standard to a showup case when, if the Wade policy had even been
persuasive, the result would have been exactly opposite. In fact a
showup, as discussed in Wade,59 like the one in Stovall, where the suspect
was presented to the witness handcuffed to a policeman, clearly conveyed
the suggestion that the one presented was believed to be guilty by the
police. 60 By not setting down any guidelines, the Court recognizes the
gap between the critical stage doctrine and its policy by explicitly leaving
open the opportunity for legislatures to remove the critical stage status by
formulating rules to govern the lineup.61 It is altogether possible that
the Court has made a hasty intrusion into police station procedure. What
is clear, however, is that these cases indicate nothing certain.
One year after Stovall, the Court applied the totality of circumstances
test to two situations which occurred prior to the Wade date. In Simmons
v. United States,62 the Court justified the use of a pre-arrest photographic
59. 388 U.S. at 234. "And the vice of suggestion created by the identification
in Stovall, . . . was the presentation to the witness of the suspect alone handcuffed
to police officers. It is hard to imagine a situation more clearly conveying the
suggestion to the witness that the one presented is believed guilty by the police."
60. Stovall was handcuffed to a policeman, surrounded by four other officers
and was the only Black person in the room. Ms. Behrendt had, a day earlier,
undergone major surgery as a result of eleven stab wounds and had watched the mur-
der of her husband. The petitioner was identified only after he spoke a few words.
Showups, like this one, are the "'most grossly suggestive identification procedures
now or ever used by the police.' . . . Whatever may be said of lineups, showing
a suspect singly to a victim is pregnant with prejudice. The message is clear:
the police suspect this man. That carries a powerful suggestive thought. Even
in a lineup the ability to identify the criminal is severely limited by normal falli-
bilities of memory and perception. When the subject is shown singly, havoc
is more likely to be played with the best-intended recollections." Biggers v.
Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404, 407 (1968) (Douglas dissenting).
61. 388 U.S. at 239.
62. 390 U.S. 377 (1967). See generally Comment, Photographic Identifica-
tion: The Hidden Persuader, 56 IowA L. REv. 408 (1970). But see United
States v. Ash, 461 F.2d 92 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 407 U.S. 909 (1972)
(where the defendant was in custody, after arrest, and no lineup was held, but photo-
graphs were used-held that it violated his right to counsel at a critical stage of
the prosecution). See also 39 A.L.R.3d 1000 (1971).
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identification where more than one possible suspect was in the picture. The
holding was based on the exigencies of the situation. Since the procedure
was held not to be suggestive, it was approved. In Biggers v. Tennessee,
63
a pre-indictment showup was conducted and the petitioner was chosen
solely by the fact that his voice was similar to the one the victim had
heard. The showup was without notice to counsel and could easily have
been replaced with a lineup. In affirming the conviction, the Court
clearly contravened the spirit of Wade.
Though applied in different circumstances, two standards have simul-
taneously evolved: (1) whether the in-court identification based on the
illegal lineup was of an independent source, and (2) regardless of coun-
sel's presence, whether the procedures violated due process. Since dis-
tinction between Wade and Stovall is possible,64 it is not unreasonable to
assume that the second standard might not be abolished in certain factual
situations (like showups) occurring after June 12, 1967. This could pro-
duce the anomaly of counsel not being considered necessary, though a
procedure may be deemed so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal. 65
Though the result would be the same under Wade, it clearly belies Wade's
reasoning and puts a foot in the door for further decisions like Biggers v.
Tennessee. 6
Since the lineup in Foster v. California67 was prior to the Wade date,
the Court held that where the defendant was put in a lineup wearing a
jacket similar to the one worn by the robber, and with two men much
shorter than he, the procedure was violative of due process. 68  The victim
could not positively identify him in the lineup, nor in a showup hours
later. However, in another lineup a week later, the victim positively
identified Foster. In Coleman v. Alabama, while the lineup, prior to
Wade, was held not to be impermissibly suggestive so as to violate due
process, the Court extended the critical stage doctrine to preliminary hear-
63. 390 U.S. 404 (1967).
64. Possibly on the facts: one being a lineup and the other a showup in emer-
gency circumstances, since subsequent cases do not view the actual procedure itself
as significant as did Wade. Cf. Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1967). See
also 338 U.S. at 228-35.
65. Such a case might arise out of a showup which is extremely suggestive.
It should be noted that in requesting that Wade be overruled, the respondent in
Kirby felt that the Stovall due process test was an adequate solution. Brief for
Respondent at 42. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
66. 390 U.S. 404 (1967).
67. 394 U.S. 440 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Foster].
68. Id. at 442-43.
19731 673CASE NOTES
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
ings.69 Thus, the Court, as in Foster, applied Stovall outside its facts to a
lineup. Within the same issue of allowing counsel to one whose liberty
is curtailed, the Court undermines the spirit of Escobedo and Wade by
not requiring counsel at a lineup, while citing Wade as authority for al-
lowing counsel at the probable cause hearing.
One result of the lineup cases was that some courts began to distin-
guish the right to counsel at post-indictment lineups from the right at pre-
indictment lineups. 70 Based on Illinois' distinction between pre- and post-
indictment lineups, 7' Kirby was granted certiorari to decide the narrow
question of whether the Court should "extend the Wade-Gilbert per se
69. 399 U.S. 1 (1970). It should be noted that in Adams v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 278 (1972), Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) was held not to be
retroactive based on the criteria set forth in Stovall for retroactivity.
70. The following allowed a pre-indictment lineup without the presence of
counsel: Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 928 (1969); Bates v. United States, 405 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1968); State v.
Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969); Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla.
1969); People v. Palmer, 41 Ill.2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969); State v. Crossman,
464 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1971); State v. Warters, 457 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1970); State v.
Thomas, 107 N.J. Super. 128, 257 A.2d 377 (1969); Martin v. Commonwealth, 210
Va. 686, 173 S.E.2d 794 (1970); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 664, 173
S.E.2d 792 (1970).
The following either explicitly or implicitly held that a right to counsel exists
prior to an indictment: Virgin Islands v. Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1971);
Cooper v. Picard, 428 F.2d 1351 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Phillips, 427
F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 867 (1970); United States v.
Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842 (1970); Long v.
United States, 424 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d
935 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp. 286 (D.D.C.
1968); People v. Fowler, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 461 P.2d 643 (1969); Palmer v.
State, 5 Md. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1969); Commonwealth v. Guillory, 356
Mass. 591, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970); People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175
N.W.2d 860 (1970); Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704 (1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 934 (1969); State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App. 2d 115, 265 N.E.2d
327 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 349 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 919 (1970); In re Holley, 268 A.2d 723 (R.I. 1970); Martinez v.
State, 437 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1969); State v. Hicks, 76 Wash. 2d 80, 455 P.2d 943
(1969); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970). See Note,
Pretrial Identification Procedure-Wade to Gilbert to Stovall: Lower Courts
Bobble the Ball, 55 MINN. L. REV. 779 (1971) and Note, The Right to Counsel at
Lineups, 36 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 830 (1969) (Wade and Gilbert in lower courts).
71. People v. Palmer, 41 Ill.2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969). In the 1971
rules of the Illinois Supreme Court, discovery rule 413 makes no distinction
between a post or pre-indictment lineup. Rule 413 states: (a) The person of the
accused. Notwithstanding the initiation of judicial proceedings, and subject to con-
stitutional limitations, a judicial officer may require the accused, among other
things, to (i) appear in a line-up; ... (b) Whenever the personal appearance of
the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time
and place of such appearance shall be given by the State to the accused and his
counsel, who shall have the right to be present. . . . Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 413(a)(b).
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exclusionary rule to identification testimony based upon a police station
showup that took place before the defendant had been indicted or other-
wise formally charged with any criminal offense."
72
While not addressing Wade's policy, the plurality based its decision
on the fact that the petitioner was entitled to counsel only "at or after
the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against
him."'73 Mr. Justice Stewart reached this conclusion by distinguishing
Miranda on the grounds that it applied solely to protect the right against
self-incrimination which had no application as per Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia74 and Wade.7 5  The opinion also distinguished Escobedo on the
grounds that its prime purpose was to protect the right to silence and that
it was strictly limited to its facts.
76
Once that argument was dispensed with, the Court reached its holding
by looking at the whole line of right to counsel cases from Powell to Cole-
man v. Alabama.77  The Court then concluded that the reason why the
right to counsel should attach once the adversary proceeding was initiated
was because only at that time did the "adverse positions of government
and defendant . . . [become] solidified."78 While declining to go be-
yond Wade to impose the per se exclusionary rule on pre-indictment
lineups, the Court felt that such a lineup could still be reviewed within
the due process test as applied in Stovall and Foster.
79
By drawing a line between post- and pre-indictment lineups, the Court
exalts form over substance in two ways. First, the Court specifically up-
72. 406 U.S. at 684. Justices Stewart, Burger, Rehnquist and Blackmun ren-
dered the Court's opinion, Mr. Justice Powell concurred in the result and Justices
Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and White dissented.
73. 406 U.S. at 688. As Mr. Justice Brennan aptly pointed out in his dissent:
"The plurality today 'decline[s] to depart from [the] rationale of Wade and
Gilbert. . . .' The plurality discovers that 'rationale' not by consulting those de-
cisions themselves, which would seem to be the appropriate course ....... Id.
at 700.
74. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
75. 406 U.S. at 687-88.
76. Id. at 689. Mr. Justice Stewart cited pages 733-34 in Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) as standing for the proposition that Escobedo was
limited strictly to its facts. Upon reading those pages one will find a discussion of
Escobedo's retroactivity but no explicit prospective limitation to its facts.
It should be noted that consistent with a suggested avenue put forth in this
note, the petitioner argued that Escobedo can not be distinguished because the
confrontation was held "in the investigatory stage rather than at the accusatory
stage. .. ." Brief for Petitioner at 12. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
77. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
78. 406 U.S. at 689.
79. Id. at 690-91.
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holds Wade on the basis of its policy considerations.80 That policy goes
to the very being of the procedure itself, not merely to how it will affect
the right to a fair trial or to at what time such a procedure occurs. It is
based on the innate unreliability of eyewitness identifications and sugges-
tive police practices. That a trial may later be influenced is but a result
of this process. It is, however, the practices themselves that lie at the pith
of the Wade decision. Though the Wade critical stage rule concentrates
on the result of the lineup, it is certainly inspired by the desire to move
into the police station to protect the individual. By impliedly distin-
guishing Wade, the Court demonstrates that it no longer accepts Wade's
policy as a given. Thus, the homage paid to Wade is hasty and superfi-
cial.
Secondly, "[t]he plurality apparently considers an arrest, which for pres-
ent purposes we must assume to be based upon probable cause, to be
nothing more than part of 'a routine police investigation' . . . and thus
not 'the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice;'
...[a]n arrest, according to the plurality, does not face the accused 'with
prosecutorial forces of organized society,' nor immerse him 'in the intri-
cacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.' -81 To say that when
a man has been arrested the police have not focused on him beyond a
mere routine police investigation is repugnant to the spirit of Escobedo
and Miranda.82  To distinguish Escobedo and its disciples is to ignore
their fundamental reality.8 3
Putting aside the important issue of what effect the presence of counsel
has at a lineup, the critical stage doctrine, as applied to lineups, is too
80. Id. at 696-97.
81. Id. at 698.
82. "An arrest evidences the belief of the police that the perpetrator of a
crime has been caught. A post-arrest confrontation for identification is not 'a
mere preparatory step in the gathering of the prosecution's evidence.' Wade supra,
at 227. A primary and frequently sole purpose of the confrontation for iden-
tification at that stage is to accumulate proof to buttress the conclusion of the police
that they have the offender in hand." 406 U.S. at 699.
"The right to counsel prior to an identification confrontation is no less im-
portant to the preservation of justice than is the right to counsel prior to inter-
rogation." Brief for Petitioner at 13. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
83. In discussing Miranda, Mr. Justice Douglas said that: "[w]e were not
then concerned with whether an 'arrest' or an 'indictment' was necessary for a
person to be an 'accused' and thus entitled to Sixth Amendment protections.
We looked instead to the nature of the event and its effect on the rights involved."
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 333 (1971) (Douglas, concurring in the
result).
"Of course nothing decided or said in the opinions in the cited cases [Escobedo
and Miranda] links the right to counsel only to protection of Fifth Amendment
Rights." 388 U.S. at 226.
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subjective due to the uncertainty of whether a lineup actually impinges
on the right to a fair trial. It is clear from the movement of the Court
that though there is evidence of abuses, post-Wade courts are not con-
vinced that the lineup itself is as faulty a procedure as proclaimed by
Wade. If one is to assume that counsel is a necessary ingredient, it would
have been more suitable to focus on custody, as in Escobedo, as a more
objectively significant time to grant the right. s4 By not applying the criti-
cal stage doctrine to pre-indictment lineups, the decision exhibits this very
fundamental problem. 8 5  In these terms, it is easy to see how the Kirby
plurality could feel at ease when not only circumventing Wade's reasoning,
but also avoiding its rule.80 The Court in Kirby salutes Wade like a retir-
ing general and then makes it fade away.
From a broad perspective, Wade was a decision by the Court to move
into the police station to curtail certain abusive police practices which
threatened individual liberty. At the very least, it was a maneuver to in-
84. It could be argued that the right to counsel is not necessarily limited to
the sixth amendment. Incorporation does not have to exclude the possibility that
due process could require counsel upon state deprivation of liberty, which, for
all intents and purposes, could be once the person is taken into custody. It ap-
pears to this writer that insuring counsel is the minimum requirement for putting
the defendant on an equal footing with his adversary.
It should also be noted that the ABA approved standards for criminal justice
recommends that, "Counsel should be provided to the accused as soon as feasible
after he is taken into custody, when he appears before a committing magistrate, or
when he is formally charged, whichever occurs earliest." ABA PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRO-
VIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5.1 (approved draft, 1968) (emphasis added).
Though the "as soon as feasible" allows for the Russell v. United States, 408
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969) hedging, the tone of these standards clearly imply a
great concern for protecting individual liberty.
See also ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.6 (approved
draft, 1971 ).
85. It should be noted that the Respondent and the State of California in an
amicus curiae brief in Kirby both recommended that Wade be overruled. Brief
for Respondent at 23-43; Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent
at 7-15 (Attorney General of California).
One should also note that the post or pre-indictment distinction was not con-
sidered a significant factor in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), Foster v.
California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969), Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), and that
even the dissent in Wade characterized the Court's principle in terms of "any
lineup," 388 U.S. at 251.
86. As Mr. Justice Brennan points out "'the initiation of adversary judicial
criminal proceedings' . . . is completely irrelevant to whether counsel is necessary
at a pretrial confrontation for identification in order to safeguard the accused's
constitutional right to confrontation and the effective assistance of counsel at his
trial." 406 U.S. at 697.
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duce an awareness of police abuses. The post-Wade courts8 7 have rein-
sulated police lineup procedures which occur subsequent to an arrest.
The wide use of independent sources"" evidences the fact that the lineup
is not nearly as important, in the eyes of the Court, as those later, more
formal stages. In some cases, brief observation at the time of the offense
(followed by a lineup without counsel months later) was sufficient to
sustain an independent source identification even though the lineup iden-
tification was excluded.89 This is but another indication of the dilution
of the Wade principle.
There are at least two possible consequences which could accrue from
these cases. The first is that the whole criminal process may ultimately
87. Instead of moving towards abolition or at least regulation of police lineups,
post-Wade courts have evidenced the opposite desire (e.g., wide use of inde-
pendent sources and lack of any positive procedural suggestions). Legislatures
have also gone the opposite way. Congress, on June 19, 1968, passed § 3501 of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act which attempted to explicitly
overrule Wade and Gilbert: "The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused
commit or participate in the commission of a crime for which the accused is
being tried shall be admissible in evidence in a criminal prosecution in any trial
court ordained and established under Article III of the Constitution of the United
States." 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (Supp. 1968).
88. One reason for the failure of the Wade principle is embodied in the wide
use of the "independent source" rule. In some cases, the observation at the time
of the crime itself was sufficient to be of an independent source: see, e.g., Long v.
United States, 424 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1969) and People v. Wilson, 79 CaL Rptr.
303 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 974 (1970). See also Moore v. Eyman,
464 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. LaValle, 461 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.
1972); Pettett v. United States, 434 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1970); Terry v. Peyton,
433 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1970); Haskins v. United States, 433 F.2d 836 (10th
Cir. 1970); Plies v. United States, 431 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1970); Virgin Islands v.
Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1971); Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230
(D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. Vessel, 80 Cal. Rptr. 617, 275 Cal.App.2d 1012
(1969); State v. Tehee, 445 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1969); State v. Hughes, 5 N.C. App.
639, 169 S.E.2d 1 (1969); Wilson v. State, 458 P.2d 315 (Okla. 1969); State v.
Mershon, 1 Ore.App. 305, 459 P.2d 551 (1969); State v. Hicks, 76 Wash.2d 80,
455 P.2d 943 (1969).
For a discussion on the split of authority concerning the admissibility of prior
extrajudicial identifications, as independent evidence of identity, both by the wit-
ness and third parties present prior to identification, see 71 A.L.R.2d 449 (1971),
and 5 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service 1225-28 (1971). These above mentioned cases
attest to the fact that they, contrary to the belief of Justice White in Wade, did not
impose a "heavy burden on the State and probably an impossible one [and that for] all
intents and purposes, courtroom identifications are barred if pretrial identifica-
tions have occurred without counsel being present." 388 U.S. at 251 (Justice
White dissenting in part and concurring in part).
89. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 6 Ill. App. 3d 500, 285 N.E.2d 515 (1972)
(victim saw accused eight minutes during the alleged offense; then at an illegal




be retarded since it would be in the best interest of the defendant's ad-
versary to delay in the procurement of an indictment so that a lineup
could be held without having to obtain counsel for the accused. The
most likely result, however, may be that the police will stop conducting
lineups in favor of arranging prompt showups in an effort to fall within
the ambit of Stovall9" and now Kirby.
Though no definitive answers are presented, what is clear is that the
critical stage doctrine has reached the end of its line, and form has
jammed the system of procedural safeguards so necessary for the protec-
tion of individual liberty. When the most essential procedural safeguard
is dependent on whether an indictment has been returned one must ask
for whom the balance between the individual and the state is tipped. 91
Edward Albert
90. Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1969) and see 388 U.S.
at 228-35.
91. While commenting on recent Supreme Court criminal decisions, the Jour-
nal of the American Bar Association described Kirby as "perhaps the least de-
fensible, from a technical point of view, of the Court's criminal law holdings during
the term." 58 A.B.A.J. 1092 (1972).
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